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As Covid-19 took hold last year, it became clear that parts of the UK economy would need 
to be temporarily shut down in order to reduce the spread of the virus, and thereby save 
lives. However, unemployment rose by less than anticipated, with the unemployment 
rate among people aged 16 and older rising by just over one percentage point in the past 
year. And yet, the damage from the country’s collective need to put large portions of the 
economy on hold has been far more concentrated among young people than expected. 
Youth unemployment rose faster between spring and autumn 2020 than at any point 
since the financial crisis. And though that rate of increase has since slowed, there have 
been significant differences in the increase in unemployment that has occurred not just 
between generations but also within them. This note explores both the scale and the 
distribution of the labour market change experienced by young people over the past year.
Since the pandemic began, young people have been more likely than their middle-aged 
counterparts to have lost working hours, experienced lower pay, been put on furlough or 
have lost their job. In fact, young workers (those aged 16-24) have accounted for nearly 
two-thirds of the total fall in payrolled employment that occurred in the year to February. 
This has exacerbated pre-existing intergenerational inequalities, wherein during the 
decade before the pandemic, younger people had experienced lower rates of pay growth 
and higher rates of working in the country’s lowest-paid sectors (retail, hospitality, and 
arts and leisure), compared to their predecessors while the same age. 
But the growing sectoral concentration among younger generations offers one part 
of the explanation as to why the young have experienced such a disproportionately 
large portion of the past year’s economic pain. Going into the pandemic, the share of 
18-24-year-olds working in one of these hard-hit sectors was more than twice as large 
as the share of 25-65-year-olds that did. And once the virus hit, young people working 
in these sectors were nearly three times as likely to have moved out of work than their 
25-64-year-old counterparts. 
But just as the impact of the Covid-19 crisis has been unequally spread between 
generations, it’s been unequally spread within them, too. We find that in many cases, 
conditions have deteriorated most among those young people whose pre-pandemic 
employment position had already been weakest. Before the onset of Covid-19 (Q2-
Q4 2019), one-in-four (25 per cent) economically active Black 16-24-year-olds were 
unemployed, compared to one-in-ten (10 per cent) of their White counterparts. By Q2-Q4 
2020, the unemployment rate rose to 34 per cent (a 9 percentage point increase) among 
Black young people and to 13 per cent (a 2 point rise) among White young people. 
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Importantly, the crisis has not just been characterised by young people losing their jobs, 
but also by recent education leavers struggling to find their first job. Between 2019 and 
2020 the unemployment rate among graduates and non-graduates who had left full-time 
education within the previous year rose by 4 percentage points each, to 18 and 14 per 
cent, respectively. Young male graduates have not been spared the pain of this crisis: 
between Q2-Q4 2019 and Q2-Q4 2020 unemployment among young male graduates rose 
more than 5 points, to 17.5 per cent – meaning that young graduate men had a higher 
unemployment rate than both their female counterparts (10.2 per cent) and non-graduate 
men (15.9 per cent). 
The rise in unemployment would have been larger had it not been for a sharp uptick in 
full-time education participation, especially among 16-17-year-olds. Though the share of 
16-17-year-olds who were employed (and not in full-time education) fell by 1.8 percentage 
points in the year to November 2020-January 2021, the proportion in full-time study 
rose by twice as much: 3.6 points. During the same period, the share of 18-24-year-olds 
that were employed (outside of full-time education) fell by 3.2 points while the share 
in full-time study rose by 2 points – a smaller amount than the fall in employment but 
large enough to limit the rise in unemployment. Across most groups of young people, 
the share who were in full-time study has increased over the last year – even if the rise 
was not large enough to absorb larger falls in employment. For example, the share of 
Black 16-24-year-olds in full-time study rose by nearly 3 points, which helped soften 
but certainly not overcome the larger fall in employment experienced by this group (-9 
points). 
As we come out of the crisis, policy makers should reflect on the price younger 
generations have paid for the country’s collective need to put restrictions in place in 
order to slow the spread of the virus, and ultimately save lives. The challenge is threefold: 
building avenues to help young people into the workplace; providing them with support 
to stay in – or return to –education and training; and working with employers and 
employment support providers to tackle bias and discrimination in the hiring process 
and career progression more generally. 
The employment effects of the Covid-19 crisis have been particularly 
pronounced among young people
Since last spring, it has been clear that young people’s employment prospects have 
been disproportionately affected by the economic consequences of the Covid-19 crisis. 
Resolution Foundation research found that as early as May 2020, one-third of 18-24-year-
olds had been furloughed or lost their main job – compared to less than 15 per cent of 
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their 35-44-year-old counterparts.1 By January 2021, it had become even clearer that 
the crisis has had a ‘U-shaped’ impact across the age distribution, with younger and to 
a slightly lesser extent, older workers worse off than average. More than four-in-ten (41 
per cent) 18-24-year-olds who had been employed the previous February were no longer 
working, were furloughed or were being paid at least 10 per cent less than they had been 
before the Covid-19 crisis; as were nearly one-in-three (30 per cent) of workers aged 55 
and older. This was the case among a significantly lower share of 25-54-year-olds (22 per 
cent).2 Moreover, between February 2020 and February 2021, younger workers accounted 
for nearly two-thirds of the total fall in payrolled employment.3 
It is well established that periods of unemployment often lead to employment and pay 
‘scarring’ over the long-term: unemployment spells can act as a negative signalling 
device for employers, putting them off hiring candidates who have experienced this. 
Moreover, the actual amount of time spent out of work reduces opportunities for skills 
development and progression.4 Both of these factors are particularly pernicious for young 
people, given that pay progression is typically highest in the early years of a person’s 
career, and that young people have less of a track record of previous employment 
to show to employers. For that reason, this note focuses primarily on scale and the 
distribution of the rise in youth unemployment since the start of the Covid-19 crisis, with 
a particular focus on the changing rate of youth unemployment across different groups 
of young people. 
We begin, however, by highlighting the relative shift in labour market activity among 
16-17-year-olds, 18-24-year-olds and all aged 16-64, shown in Figure 1. After several years 
of steadily rising, the employment rate among all aged 16-64 fell from 76.5 to 75 per cent 
(a 1.5 point decline) between November 2019-January 2020 (just before the onset of 
Covid-19) and November 2020-January 2021. During the same time period, employment 
among 18-24-year-olds it fell from 63.6 to 60 per cent (a 3.6 point fall) and among 
16-17-year-olds it fell from 24 to 16.3 per cent (7.7 points). 
The overall effects of the Covid-19 crisis on unemployment have been more muted 
than we would otherwise have anticipated, as large-scale take-up of the Job Retention 
Scheme prevented millions of workers from falling into redundancy.5 Among all aged 
16-64, the unemployment rate rose by just over a percentage point (from 4 to 5.1 per 
1  Excluding full-time students. Source: M Gustafsson, Young workers in the coronavirus crisis: Findings from the Resolution 
Foundation’s coronavirus survey, Resolution Foundation, May 2020.
2  N Cominetti, K Henehan, G Thwaites & H Slaughter, Long Covid in the labour market:The impact on the labour market of Covid-19 
a year into the crisis, and how to secure a strong recovery, Resolution Foundation, February 2020.
3  Resolution Foundation, Employment falls but furlough and lockdown combined see job market enter 2021 in deep freeze, March 
2021.
4  For a more detailed discussion on pay scarring from unemployment among young people, see: P Gregg & E Tominey, The wage 
scar from male youth unemployment, Labour Economics, 12(4), August 2005.
5  For a detailed discussion of how to interpret labour market statistics during the Covid-19 crisis, see: M Brewer, L Gardiner & K 
Handscomb, The truth will out: Understanding labour market statistics during the coronavirus crisis, Resolution Foundation, July 
2020. 
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cent), between November 2019-January 2020 and November 2020-January 2021. The 
unemployment rate also rose to higher levels, from a higher starting point, among those 
aged 16-17 (5.6 points, from 22.1 to 27.7 per cent) and 18-24 (2.7 points, 10.5 to 13.2 per cent) 
over the same time frame. 
FIGURE 1: The increase in 18-24-year-old unemployment between April-June 
and July-September 2020 was the sharpest since at least 1992
Economic activity by time period and age group: UK 
SOURCE: ONS, UNEM01 SA: Unemployment by age and duration (seasonally adjusted).
However, it is the sharpness of the rise in unemployment that has occurred among 
younger people that’s particularly striking. Between April-June and July-September 2020, 
the unemployment rate among 18-24-year-olds, rose from 11.5 to 13.6 per cent – a 2.1 
point increase, which represents the largest quarter-on-quarter rise in unemployment 
since May 2009. It also represents the largest quarter-on-quarter percentage increase (18 
per cent) since at least March 1992 (the earliest available data in this timeseries).  And 
though that rate of increase has since slowed, the unemployment rate among both 16-17 
and 18-24-year-olds remains higher than at any point since the close aftermath of the 
financial crisis. 
Instead of moving into unemployment, some workers who lost their jobs will have moved 
into economic inactivity, where they are not actively seeking work. This could include, 
for example, people who moved into full-time study or into early retirement, or who 
turned to caring responsibilities. Between November 2019-January 2020 and November 
2020-January 2021, the inactivity rate among 16-64-year-olds overall rose somewhat (from 
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18-24-year-olds, from 28.9 to 30.9 per cent (2 points), and larger still among those 16-17: 
from 69.2 per to 77.5 per cent (an 8 point increase).  
Indeed, Figure 2 shows that since the start of the pandemic, there was a large rise in the 
number of 16-17-year-olds who were in full-time study, which outweighed the fall in the 
number of 16-17-year-olds who were in work. Between November 2019-January 2020 and 
November 2020-January 2021, the total rise in the number of 16-17-year-olds who were 
in full-time study but not working (roughly 164,000) was larger than the combined fall in 
the number who were employed but not in full-time education, employed and in full-time 
education, and not employed and not in full-time education (approximately 126,000). As 
a share of the 16-17-year-old population, employment (outside of full-time education) fell 
by 1.8 percentage points while the proportion in full-time study rose by twice as much: 3.6 
points. 
FIGURE 2: Full-time study has helped to limit a sharp rise in unemployment
Change in economic activity between November 2019-January 2020 and November 
2020-January 2021, by age group: UK 
SOURCE: RF analysis of ONS, A06 SA: Educational status and labour market status for people aged from 16 
to 24 (seasonally adjusted).
Among 18-24-year-olds, growth in the number who were in full-time study but not 
employed (114,000) was substantial, with the overall share of 18-24-year-olds in full-time 
education rising by 2 percentage points (from 32 to 34 per cent) over the time period. 
However, the increase in full-time study was smaller than the combined fall in the number 
who were employed and growth in the numbers who were both not employed and not in 
full-time education (295,000). (The share of 18-24-year-olds that were employed outside of 
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words, education was – understandably – unable to absorb the full fall in employment 
among 18-24-year-olds like it did with 16-17-year-olds. But even still, the growth in full-time 
study has helped matters from becoming worse: young people participating in education 
will – we would expect – be gaining knowledge and skills for future employment while 
also avoiding the significant employment and wage scarring than can stem from being 
unemployed while young. 
Although we are as yet unable to identify the details of the extent to which the 
composition of full-time study has shifted over the past year, figures from the Labour 
Force Survey indicate a rise in the proportion of 16-17-year-olds studying for Level 3 
(A-level equivalent) courses (up by 1.5 percentage points during Q2-Q4 2020 compared 
to the same period in 2019), and a smaller uptick in the share on sub-degree higher-
education level courses (just under 1 point). 
Administrative education data provides another clue: figures from the Department 
for Education (DfE) indicate that since the start of the Covid-19 crisis, the number 
apprenticeship starts in England has fallen. These falls have been particularly 
pronounced among young people – exacerbating a longer-term decline in the number 
of 16-24-year-olds starting an apprenticeship. For example, between the 2018/19 and 
2019/20 academic years, the number of 16-18-year-olds that started an apprenticeship 
fell by 22,400 (29 per cent) and the number of 19-24-year-old apprenticeship starts fell 
by 21,800 (30 per cent).6 Some of this will have been driven by the difficulty of running 
apprenticeships in sectors that were affected by social-distancing restrictions, including 
for example, retail, leisure, and food and accommodation, which comprise a large share of 
all apprenticeship starts among young people.7 It is not yet clear whether apprenticeship 
starts will revert to their pre-crisis levels as the economy re-opens, but the decline in 
opportunities will (at least in the past year) have forced a large number of young people 
to look elsewhere for study and training options.
In contrast to apprenticeships, figures from the University and College Admissions 
Service (UCAS) indicate that September 2020 featured the largest year-on-year increase 
in the 18-year-old university placement rate on record: up 8 per cent from 2019. Moreover, 
the proportion of 18-year-olds from the most deprived areas with a confirmed place also 
reached a record high, at 27 per cent. 8
6  The number of starts among apprentices age 25 and older – who have long formed between 40-47 per cent of all starts also fell, 
but to a smaller degree: 30,300 (17 per cent). Source: Department for Education, Apprenticeships and traineeships, February 2021.
7  K Henehan, Apprenticeships: why new starters are so important, TES, January 2021.
8  By ‘most deprived’ the analysis refers to Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) quintile 1. Universities and Colleges Admissions 
Service, Daily clearing analysis: 10 September 2020, published 24 September 2020.
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The rise in youth unemployment is heavily skewed towards those 
with Black and Asian backgrounds
Of course, the aggregate figures set out in Figure 1 and Figure 2 tell us little about which 
groups of young people’s employment outcomes have been most, or least, affected since 
the onset of the Covid-19 crisis. Figure 3 attempts to shed light on this, by illustrating the 
unemployment rate for different groups of 16-24-year-olds, as well as the share that were 
employed, inactive but in full-time education, and inactive and not in full-time education. 
It presents this information for Q2-Q4 2020 (after Covid-19 had reached the UK) and for 
the same period in 2019 (before Covid-19 had reached the UK).9  
Among 16-24-year-olds overall, unemployment rose from 11.8 to 14.2 per cent; 
however, this varied substantially for different groups of young people. For example, 
unemployment among 16-24-year-olds with a degree-level qualification (or higher) 
remained lower during Q2-Q4 2020 (13.3 per cent) than among their counterparts with 
lower-level qualifications (i.e. GCSE-equivalent qualifications or lower, 20.4 per cent). 
However, the size of the increase in unemployment was proportionally larger among 
graduates: between Q2-Q4 2019 and Q2-Q4 2020, unemployment rose from 10 to 13.3 per 
cent among graduates (a 33 per cent increase) and from 17 to 20.4 per cent among those 
with lower-level qualifications (a 20 per cent increase). 
Differences in unemployment, and the relative change in unemployment, are starker 
once we turn to ethnicity. Even before the onset of Covid-19, the unemployment rate 
among Black young people (25 per cent over Q2-Q4 2019) was higher than among their 
Asian counterparts (21 per cent), and 2.5 times the rate of their White counterparts (10 
per cent). Since the onset of Covid-19, these differences have been exacerbated. During 
Q2-Q4 2020, the unemployment rate among Black young people rose to 35 per cent (a 10 
point increase), which was 2.7 times the unemployment rate among young White people 
during the same period (13 per cent, representing a 3 point increase on Q2-Q4 2020). 
Over the same period unemployment among Asian young people rose 3 points to 23.7 
per cent.
9  In order to achieve a sufficiently-large sample size, we use an aggregated ethnicity variable, which combines Black African 
and Black Caribbean; Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi; and White British, White Irish and White Other into three categories. 
This is important especially where we provide more detailed breakdowns of unemployment, such as qualification level within 
ethnicity. (For this reason, we also refer to unemployment across several quarters, rather than a single quarter, for much of this 
note.) However, these aggregated categories mask variation within the groups presented here. For example, previous Resolution 
Foundation research into employment and pay patterns shows the extent to which adults from an Indian background, on 
average, tend to have higher levels of education and pay, and higher rates of employment than their Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
counterparts. We also found similar, albeit somewhat smaller, differences between adults with Black African and Black Caribbean 
backgrounds. See: K Henehan & H Rose, Opportunities Knocked? Exploring pay penalties among the UK’s ethnic minorities, 
Resolution Foundation, July 2018.
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FIGURE 3: The proportion of Black young people that are unemployed grew by 
more than one-third between Q2-Q4 2019 and Q2-Q4 2020
Unemployment rate and economic activity among 16-24-year-olds by highest 
qualification achieved, gender and ethnicity: UK, Q2-Q4 2019 and Q2-Q4 2020
NOTES: ‘Mid-level’ qualifications include sub-degree higher education qualifications (for example 
Foundation Degrees and Higher National Certificates/Diplomas) and Level 3-equivalent qualifications 
(including A levels). Lower-level qualifications refer to qualifications at Level 2 (GSCE-equivalent) and 
below, including those classed as ‘other.’ The unemployment rate is measured as the total number 
of unemployed people as a proportion of the total number of economically active (employed and 
unemployed) people, and therefore has a different denominator to the share who are either inactive or 
employed (which are measured as a share of the total population).
SOURCE:  RF analysis of ONS, Labour Force Survey.
For most groups, the rise in the unemployment rate corresponded with a fall in 
employment. Among 16-24-year-olds a whole, a 2.8 percentage point increase in 
unemployment corresponded to a 2.8 point fall in the share who were employed (from 
54.9 to 52.1 per cent). The scale of change varies across different groups: for example, 
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whereas it fell by 3.5 points (from 59.4 to 56 per cent) among White young people. The 
proportion of young people in full-time study increased across all groups: from 43.6 
to 46.4 per cent among Black young people, from 46.5 to 47.7 per cent among Asian 
young people and from 23.8 to 26 per cent among young White people. Although they 
had higher-levels of education participation, Black and Asian young people who were 
economically active (and therefore not in full-time study) continued to face a more 
difficult time in the labour market.
FIGURE 4: Since the pandemic, unemployment among young Black graduates 
rose by nearly 12 percentage points, compared to a 4 point rise among White 
graduates
Unemployment among 16-24-year-olds who are no longer in full-time study, by 
qualification level, gender and ethnicity: UK, Q2-Q4 2019 and Q2-Q4 2020
SOURCE:  RF analysis of ONS, Labour Force Survey. The unemployment rate is measured as the total 
number of unemployed people as a proportion of the total number of economically active (employed and 
unemployed) people, and therefore has a different denominator to the share who are either inactive or 
employed (which are measured as a share of the total population).
How do these differences fare when we compare unemployment and economic activity 
by gender and ethnicity within qualification level? Figure 4 shows the unemployment 
rate among 16-24-year-olds in Q2-Q4 2019 and Q2-Q4 2020, according to whether or not 
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We find that even before Covid-19, graduate men had a higher unemployment rate than 
graduate women (11.3 and 8.1 per cent, respectively). But since the Covid-19 crisis, male 
graduate unemployment rose more than 5 points to 17.5 per cent – meaning that during 
Q2-Q4 2020 graduate men had a higher unemployment rate than both graduate women 
(10.2 per cent) and non-graduate men (15.9 per cent). 
Moreover, we find stark ethnicity-based differences both in the rise and in the latest 
level of youth unemployment. Between Q2-Q4 2019 and Q2-Q4 2020, the size of the 
increase in unemployment among young Black graduates (11.6 points, from 22.1 to 33.7 
per cent) was nearly three times the size of the increase in unemployment among their 
White counterparts (4.1 points, from 8.7 to 12.8 per cent). In the second half of 2020, the 
unemployment rate among young White graduates (12.8 per cent) was lower than that of 
young Asian graduates (15.9 per cent) and well under half that of young Black graduates 
(33.7 per cent).10 
In other words, Figure 3 and Figure 4 highlight three key inequities: first, although young 
people from Black and Asian backgrounds participate in education at a higher rate than 
their White counterparts, those that are economically active face on average a more 
difficult experience in the labour market compared to young White people. Second, even 
after achieving degree-level qualifications, which they do at a higher rate than young 
White people11, Asian, and especially Black, graduates face a comparatively more difficult 
time in the labour market. Third, the already comparatively weak employment position of 
Black young people has deteriorated further than those of their White counterparts since 
the onset of the pandemic.
Recent leavers have struggled to find their way in the Covid-19 labour 
market
Towards the beginning of the Covid-19 crisis, there were significant concerns that 
recent education leavers would be particularly hard hit in the labour market: although 
unemployment typically runs higher among younger people compared to their older 
counterparts, Resolution Foundation analysis has shown that young people who leave 
full-time education during a recession, or in the immediate aftermath of one, will have 
an even more difficult time finding work. What’s more, the ‘scarring’ effects of leaving 
10  Given that breakdowns of recent leavers by both ethnicity and qualification can lead to smaller sample sizes (of less than 90 
within a given qualification type) among Black and Asian young graduates, we ran the same analysis using a broader time frame in 
order to boost the sample (Q1-Q4 2019 and Q1-Q4 2020). Doing so reduced slightly all groups’ 2020 unemployment rates (because 
it includes Q1, a pre-Covid-19 period) but both the ordering of 2020 employment rates (with Black young graduates having 
an employment rate that is more than twice the size of their White counterparts) and the relative increase (with Black young 
graduates seeing a larger increase in unemployment) remained similar to the figures discussed above. 
11  See: K Henehan & H Rose, Opportunities Knocked? Exploring pay penalties among the UK’s ethnic minorities, Resolution 
Foundation, July 2018.
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education in the midst of a recession will persist for several years.12 A year on from 
the crisis and the ‘class of 2020’ leavers entering the labour market, we are not yet in 
a position to estimate longer-term scarring effects of the Covid-19 crisis – but we are 
able to test whether unemployment has risen among recent leavers more so than their 
counterparts who left education in previous years. 
To that end, Figure 5 shows the unemployment rate among young people during both 
Q2-Q4 2019 and Q2-Q4 2020, according to whether or not they have a degree-level 
qualification or higher, and the approximate number of years since they have left full-time 
education (specifically, the difference between a respondent’s current age and they age 
they were upon leaving full-time education). We would normally expect unemployment 
to be higher in the immediate aftermath of leaving education, as it takes time for people 
to find their way in the labour market. For example, in 2019 unemployment among non-
graduates who had left education that same year was 23 per cent; unemployment among 
non-graduates who had left education a year earlier was substantially lower, at 14 per 
cent.
Figure 5 shows that in 2020, unemployment rose for both graduates and non-graduates, 
regardless of how many years it’s been since they left education. However, the size of the 
increase in unemployment was particularly large for recent leavers, meaning those who 
left education in the same year, or just a year earlier. For example, among non-graduates 
who had left education one year prior, unemployment increased from 14 to 18 per cent 
between 2019 and 2020; among graduates it rose from 10 to 14 per cent. In other words, 
there is strong evidence to suggest that the Class of 2020 (and likely, a large share of the 
Class of 2019) have struggled to find employment in a Covid-19-affected labour market.
We might expect unemployment to be higher among recent leavers, because this group 
will be younger than their non-graduate/graduate counterparts within the broader 16-24 
age range. However, unemployment among recent leavers remains higher than youth 
unemployment overall even when we look at specific age groups within the 16-24 age 
range. For example, among 16-19-year-olds, unemployment during Q2-Q4 2020 was 1 point 
higher among recent leavers (who left full-time study fewer than two years ago, 20 per 
cent) than among their similarly-aged counterparts who left full-time study less recently 
(two or more years ago, 19 per cent). These differences were even larger among those 
aged 20-22 (21 and 9 per cent, respectively) and 23-24 (15 and 8 per cent, respectively).13 
12  See: K Henehan, Class of 2020: Education leavers in the current crisis, Resolution Foundation, May 2020; S Clarke, Growing Pains: 
the impact of leaving education during a recession on earnings and employment, Resolution Foundation, May 2019. 
13  Moreover, the size of the difference between recent education leavers and less-recent leavers within a given age group was larger 
among 20-22-year-olds during Q2-Q4 2020 (12.7 percentage points) than the same period in 2019 (7.6 points); it was also larger 
among 23-24-year-olds during Q2-Q4 2020 (6.2 points) than the same period in 2019 (5.7 points).
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FIGURE 5: Unemployment has risen most among those young people who have 
very recently left education 
Unemployment rate of 16-24-year-olds according to the number of years since having 
left full-time education: UK
NOTES: Young people who are unemployed but who also report being in full-time education are excluded. 
Those on part-time courses are not excluded. Years since leaving education is calculated by subtracting a 
respondent’s current age from the age they reported they were upon leaving full-time education. 
SOURCE: RF analysis of ONS, Labour Force Survey.
In part, this will have been driven by the fact that sectors like hospitality and leisure – 
which recruit younger workers and especially education leavers at a disproportionately 
high rate14 – have been under severe business constraints for the past year.15 For example, 
figures from a January 2021 YouGov survey16 show that before the onset of the pandemic, 
the share of 18-24-year-olds that worked in what would soon be hard-hit sectors, like 
leisure (arts, entertainment and recreation), hospitality and non-supermarket retail (29 
per cent) was more than twice the size of the share of 25-65-year-olds that did so (12 per 
cent). On top of the fact that young people were more exposed to hard-hit sectors to 
begin with, young people working in these sectors were also more likely to have moved 
out of work (excluding furlough) than their older counterparts. Among 18-24-year-olds 
14  Previous Resolution Foundation research found that on average between 2009-19, roughly one-in-four graduates, one-in-
three leavers with Level 3 (A level-equivalent) qualifications and four-in-ten leavers with lower-level (GCSE-equivalent and 
below) qualifications would work in sector that would be shut down or face social-distancing restrictions (such as food and 
accommodation, retail or leisure, etc.) in the year that they left full-time education. See: K Henehan, Class of 2020: Education 
leavers in the current crisis, Resolution Foundation, May 2020. 
15  See: M Gustafsson & C McCurdy, Risky business: Economic impacts of the coronavirus crisis on different groups of workers, 
Resolution Foundation, April 2020; K Henehan, Class of 2020: Education leavers in the current crisis, Resolution Foundation, May 
2020. 
16  The survey, funded by the Health Foundation, and undertaken by YouGov from the 22nd to the 26th January 2021 in the UK, has a 
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who worked in leisure, hospitality and non-supermarket retail during February 2020, 30 
per cent reported having moved out of work by January 2021 – compared with just 9 per 
cent of 25-65-year-olds.17
How have recent education leavers fared when we account for factors like qualifications, 
gender and ethnicity? Figure 6 shows that many of the same patterns that characterised 
unemployment among young people as a whole persist when we narrow our focus to 
recent leavers (those who left full-time education within the previous two years) – only 
the proportion experiencing unemployment is larger. For example, during Q2-Q4 2020, 
the share of recent education leavers with a White background that are unemployed 
(14.5 per cent) was significantly lower than their counterparts with an Asian background 
(23 per cent) and well under half of the share of recent education leavers with a Black 
background that were unemployed (37.8 per cent).
FIGURE 6: Nearly one-in-four recent education leavers with an Asian 
background are unemployed, as are more than one-in-three recent education 
leavers with a Black background
Unemployment according to amount of time since a respondent left their last job 
and personal characteristics, 16-24-year-olds who left full-time education within the 
previous two years: UK, Q2-Q4 2019 and Q2-Q4 2020
NOTES: Young people who are unemployed but who also report being in full-time education are excluded. 
Those on part-time courses are not excluded. This chart only includes 16-24-year-olds who report having 
left full-time education within the previous two years, where years since leaving education is calculated 
by subtracting a respondent’s current age from the age they reported they were upon leaving full-time 
education. 
SOURCE: RF analysis of ONS, Labour Force Survey.
17 The sample size for these figures are as follows: all 18-24-year-olds who worked in arts, recreation and leisure, hospitality or non-
supermarket retail during February 2020 (n=147); all 25-64 year-olds who worked in arts, recreation and leisure, hospitality or non-
supermarket retail during February 2020 (n=512). 
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Once again, the year-on-year increase was more pronounced among recent leavers 
with a Black background (a 56 per cent rise, from 24.2 to 37.8 per cent) and an Asian 
background (a 36 per cent rise, from 16.9 to 23 per cent) than a White background (an 
11.5 per cent rise, from 13 to 14.5 per cent). Although women who recently left education 
continued to have a lower rate of unemployment than their male counterparts (12.7 
versus 18.6 per cent during Q2-Q4 2020), the increase in unemployment among young 
women since the start of the Covid-19 crisis was significantly larger (28 per cent increase 
among women and an 8 per cent increase among men). 
By indicating the amount of time since an unemployed respondent left their last job 
(if they have worked before) Figure 6 also provides insight into the recent leavers’ work 
history, which could shape their odds of finding a job as the economy begins to open up. 
It’s not surprising that a large share of recent leavers at any point in time report never 
having had a paid job before – especially given the decline in part-time working among 
young people and students that’s occurred over the previous two decades.18 
The proportion of recent leavers who are unemployed and reported never having had a 
paid job changed little (falling from 8.7 to 8.1 per cent) between Q2-Q4 2019 and Q2-Q4 
2020. And although it shifted only slightly according to qualification level and gender, it 
rose more substantially among recent leavers with a Black background (17.5 to 21.6 per 
cent). This suggests once again, that recent leavers, and especially many of those with an 
ethnic minority background, are not just losing work but struggling to find it in the first 
place, more so than their counterparts struggled in the past.
This also suggests that the flow of recent leavers into work is not just lower than it was 
before the crisis, but lower still for those who had a more difficult time transitioning 
from education to employment in the first place. By turning specifically to inflows to 
employment (the proportion of people who moved from being out of work during the 
first wave of their participation in the longitudinal element of the Labour Force Survey to 
being in work by their fifth wave of participation) in Figure 7, we find that inflows among 
all groups of workers remained well below their pre-Covid-19 rates. This is the case for 
both non-graduates and, especially, for graduates. 
Since the onset of Covid-19, the share of both graduates and non-graduates who moved 
from being out of work to in work over a five-quarter period has fallen. This decline was 
largest during Q3 2020 (compared to Q3 2019) among graduates; among non-graduates 
it was largest during Q4 2020 (relative to Q4 2019). In other words, despite the fact that 
flows into work tend to be higher among young people,19 the data so far do not suggest 
18  For a detailed discussion, see: L Gardiner,  Never ever: Exploring the increase in people who’ve never had a paid job, Resolution 
Foundation, January 2020.
19  Given that a larger share of this age group are making their first moves from education into employment. 
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that a bounce back into employment occurred by the end of 2020 - among either young 
graduates or young non-graduates.
FIGURE 7: Among graduates and non-graduates, the proportion of 18-24-year-
olds flowing into work remains below pre-pandemic levels
Inflows to employment among 18-24-year-olds by quarter and qualification level: UK
SOURCE:  RF analysis of ONS Five-Quarter Longitudinal Labour Force Survey.
Looking forward, policy makers will want to prioritise education and 
employment support, while placing a premium on efforts to reduce 
bias and discrimination in the labour market
This note has helped to underscore the extent to which young peoples’ employment 
outcomes have been harmed in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis – with them experiencing 
a disproportionately large amount of economic pain in order to reduce the spread of the 
virus and ultimately save lives. It also highlighted how these impacts have been unevenly 
spread among the young – with those from Asian and especially Black backgrounds 
experiencing a significant deterioration in employment.  As the UK begins to emerge 
from Covid-19, and much of the economy begins to re-open, policy will need to recognise 
the sacrifices younger people have made in order to reduce the spread of the virus and 
ultimately save lives. This should include a threefold approach towards improving the 
opportunity and distribution of employment outcomes for younger people. 
First, they will need to continue to invest in initiatives that help young people into 
quality work, while ensuring these opportunities go towards those who stand to benefit 
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initiatives announced over the past year including under the ‘Plan for Jobs,’ like sector-
based work academies, Youth Hubs, Job Entry Targeted Support (JETS) and the Lifetime 
Skills Guarantee, will go some way towards helping young people find opportunities that 
suit them. Kickstart, the Government’s temporary youth jobs scheme for young people 
at risk of long-term unemployment (wherein the Government aim to create 250,000 six 
month-long jobs for at least 25 hours a week paid at the relevant minimum wage), is an 
excellent opportunity for allowing young people entry to the workforce, and in so doing 
an ability to build up their skills, confidence and CV. 
But as this report has shown, there were significant employment inequalities among 
young people even before the pandemic. In many cases, the pandemic has served to 
entrench these differences. For that reason, these youth-focused education and labour 
market policies should be targeted at young people who are furthest from the labour 
market – those who will struggle to make the most of opportunities even after the 
economy has bounced back. This includes extending Kickstart beyond its December 
2021 end date, but also maintaining a laser-like focus on policies to help employment 
and progression for this specific cohort of young people (who could face the Covid-19 
employment scarring for years to come) and disadvantaged younger people more 
generally, over the longer term. 
Second, and in light of the positive role that education has played in sheltering a 
growing number of young people from many of the longer-term scarring effects of youth 
unemployment, policy makers will want to ensure that young people have sufficient, 
high-quality education and training options. On the one hand, this is a longstanding 
policy need: young people will always need access to further and higher education 
in order to boost their career prospects, and (like people of all ages), retrain where 
necessary. But Covid-19 adds emphasis to this, and raises the question of whether young 
people still in education, whose learning has been interrupted over the pandemic, may 
need some element of catch-up over the longer term. At a minimum, Government should 
look to policy to re-orient the apprenticeship system away from its present focus on 
older and often, pre-existing staff, and towards a purpose centred on offering starters a 
route to a new career.20 They should also consider policies to ensure that young people 
are financially able to take on further education courses – for example, by allowing young 
people outside of higher education access to living cost funding while studying full-time.21 
20 See: K Henehan, Trading up or trading off? Understanding recent changes to England’s apprenticeships system, Resolution 
Foundation, August 2019.
21 There have been some positive shifts in this direction (for example during the next six months Universal Credit claimants will be 
able to study on a full-time basis for up to 12 weeks, where previously they only had access to 8 weeks). Source: Department for 
Work and Pensions, Universal Credit claimants TAP into employment, 1 April 2021. However, there is a more generalised difference 
in maintenance support between students in higher and further education, where the former have access to maintenance loans 
which will allow them to reduce working hours in order to study, while further education students do not.  
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And third, the stark ethnicity-based inequalities highlighted in this report make clear 
that, even among young people with the same level of education, labour market 
outcomes are highly unevenly distributed by ethnic background. Policy makers, 
employers and educators need to take this seriously. This includes encouraging firms to 
investigate these inequalities within their own workforce. But it also includes working 
with educators, employment support providers and, especially, employers, to rigorously 
identify where their support, recruitment and progression practices generate – or 
exacerbate – bias and discrimination, and put into place concrete steps for changing 
course. 
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